THE EFFECT OF THE FEDERAL BANKRUPT ACT
UPON STATE INSOLVENCY LAWS.
The dual nature of our government has given rise to many
interesting questions as to supposed and real conflicts between State and National legislation. Many of these have
long since been settled by decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States. One of the most perplexing, which still
remains open, is that of the effect to be given to legislation
by Congress by virtue of Section i of Article viii of the
Constitution of the United States.
While it is settled that so far as any state' legislationr infringes upon federal statutes providing for a uniform system
of bankruptcy throughout the United States, the state authority must, of course, give way to the national, no definite
decision of the court of last resort has answered the question as to whether a state insolvency act is entirely suspended
in all its provisions because of national bankruptcy legislation, or whether it is suspended only in so far as it applies
or is applied.
Possibly the first case in which the question was mooted
was Sturges v. Cro-winshield,1 which decided that since the
adoption of the Constitution of the United States, a
state has authority to pass a bankrupt law, provided such
law does not impair the obligation of contracts, and "provided further that there be no act of Congress in force to
establish a uniform system of bankruptcy conflicting with
such law."
Ogden v. Saunders,2 was argued in 1827 by Mr. Webster
for the defendant in error and resulted in an affirmance of
the judgment of the District Court of Louisiana, by a divided
court. It also established the principle, as stated by Mr.
Justice Johnson, "that the power given to the United States
to pass bankrupt laws is not exclusive." The first syllabus
reads:
'4 Wheat. 122 (18ig).
2

12 Wheat. 213 0827).
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"The power of Congress 'to establish uniform laws
on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United
States,' does not exclude the right of the states to legislate on the same subject, except when the power is
*actually exercised by Congress and the state laws conflict with those of Congress."
In Mayer v. Hellman,3 an action was brought by an
assignee in bankruptcy against the assignee under the assignment laws of Ohio, of the same assignors, more than six
months after the execution of the assignment under the
state laws. The Supreme Court of the United States held
that the action could not be maintained, remarking that an
assignment for the benefit of creditors "is not absolutely
void, and, if voidable, it must be because it may be deemed,
perhaps, necessary for the efficiency of the Bankrqpt Act
that the administration of an insolvent's estate shall be intrusted to the direction of the district court, and not left
under the control of the appointee of the insolvent." Mr.
Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court and said:
"The great object of the Bankrupt Act, so far as
creditors are concerned, is to secure equality of distribution among them of the property of the bankrupt. For
that purpose, it sets aside all transactions had within
a prescribed period previous to the petition in bankruptcy, defeating or tending to. defeat such distribution.
It reaches to proceedings of every form and kind undertaken or executed within that period by which a
preference can be secured to one creditor over another,
or the purposes of the Act evaded. The period is four
months for some transactions, and six months for
others. Those periods constitute the limit within which
the transactions will be examined and annulled, if conflicting with the provisions of the Bankrupt Act.
"Transactions anterior to these periods are presumed to have been acquiesced in by the creditors.
There is sound policy in prescribing a limitatin of
this kind. It would be in the highest degree injurious
91 U. S. 496 (876).
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to the community to have the validity of business transactions with debtors, in which it is interested, subject
to the contingency of being assailed by subsequent proceedings in bankruptcy. Unless, therefore, a transaction is void against creditors independent of the provisions of the Bankrupt Act, its validity is not open to
contestation by the assignee, where it took place at the
period prescribed by the statute anterior to the proceedings in bankruptcy. The assignment in this case
was not a proceeding, as already said, in hostility to
the creditors, but for their benefit. It was not, therefore, void as against them, or even voidable. Executed
six months before the petition in bankruptcy was filed,

it is, to the assignee in bankruptcy, a closed proceeding."
In Reed v. McIntyre,4 the debtor made an assignment for
the benefit of creditors, which was set aside in favor of his
subsequent assignee in bankruptcy. The creditor who levied
upon the assigned property, after the execution of the assignment and before the proceeding in bankruptcy, was held to
secure thereby no priority over the other creditors of the
bankrupt. Mr. Justice Harlan said:
"Even if it were conceded that the assignment to
Combs was an act of bankruptcy upon the ground that
it was made with the intent to prevent the property from
coming to the assignee in bankruptcy, and from being
distributed under the Bankrupt Act, it was not invalid,
except with reference to proceedings under the Bankrupt Statute, to be instituted by the bankrupt, or by
some creditor, for the purpose of bringing the bankrupt's effects into the Bankruptcy Court."
Boese v. King,5 was decided by a divided court. The
plaintiff contended that the statute of New Jersey with reference to an act by which an assignment was made was by
force of the Bankrupt Act of 1867, suspended and of no
'98 U. S. 507 (1878).
1$o8 U. S. 379 (883).
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effect. Mr. Justice Harlan, who delivered the opinion of
the court, said:
"Especially it is not necessary to determine whether
the Bankrupt Act of 1867 suspended or superseded all
of the provisions of the New Jersey Statute. Undoubtedly the local statute was from the date of the
passage of the Bankrupt Act, inoperative in so far as
it provided for the discharge of the debtor from future
liability to creditors who came in under the assignment
and participated in the distribution of the proceeds of
the assigned property."
In that case no bankruptcy proceedings were ever commenced, and the court, referring to the creditors, said:
"But they elected to lie by until after the expiration of the time within which the assignment could be
attacked under the provisions of the Bankrupt Act."
Mr. Justice Matthews delivered a short dissenting opinion,
in which concurred Mr. Justice Gray and two other justices.
He contended that the New Jersey Statute was in effect an
insolvent or bankrupt law and "was accordingly in conflict
with the National Bankrupt Act of 1867, when the latter
took effectand from that time became suspended and without
force until the repeal of the Act of Congress. It is conceded
that the i 4 th section, which provided for the discharge
of the debtor, is void by reason of this conflict, and, in our
opinion, this carries with it the entire statute. For the
statute is an entirety, and to take away the distinctive feature contained in the i4th section destroys the system. It is
not an independent provision, but an inseparable part of the
scheme coritained in the law."
Tua v. Carriere,6 involved the validity of the insolvent
Law of Louisiana, which was enacted while the Bankrupt
Actof 1867 was in force. The decision was that:
"A state insolvent law is valid though enacted
while a national bankruptcy act is in force, and on repeal of the latter it becomes operative."
S117

U. S. 201 (i886).
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Mr. Justice Woods said:
"If those [insolvency] laws had been enacted for
the first time, they would, so far as inconsistent with the
Bankrupt Act, have been inoperative while that Act remained in force, but upon its repeal would have come
into operation. The enactment of the insolvent law
during the life of the Bankrupt Act would have been
merely tantamount to a provision that the former should
take effect on the repeal of the latter. It follows that
since the repeal of the Bankrupt Act, all the provisions
of the Insolvent Law of Louisiana have been valid and
operative."
It will thus be seen that the question is still, so far as the
Supreme Federal tribunal is concerned, an open one. The
,matter becomes of great importance to the Pennsylvania
practitioner in view of the passage by the Legislature of
the Act of June 4, I9oI.
By that Act all existing laws on
the subject of insolvency are repealed and an elaborate system is created, providing that preferential assignments shall
inure to the benefit of all the creditors; that assignments
may be made, but that preferences therein shall be void; that
persons arrested on civil process can make assignments; that
involuntary insolvency proceedings may be commenced
against an insolvent, who has not made an assignment for
the benefit of creditors, and who has committed any one of
eight acts of insolvency; and further providing, among other
things, that those participating in the funds of the estate
shall sign full releases to the assignor, discharging him from
all liability, except under-eleven different sets of circumstances, such as where the action is founded on actual fraud,
embezzlement, etc. This statute having been passed while
the National Bankrupt Act of July I, 1898, was still in force,
what effcct is to be given to the state Act? The Pennsylvania cases on the point may be briefly reviewed.
In Convinonwealth v. O'Hara, Mr. Justice Williams, then
specially sitting as Associate Judge in the District Court of
Allegheny. held that:
1' ::", pha, 402 (1867).

216

EFFECT OF THE FEDERAL BANKRUPT ACT

"The bankrupt law ipso facto supersedes all proceedings under the insolvent laws of the state, in all
cases where the subject matter and the persons are the
same."
The question there arose under the Warrant of Arrest
Act of 1842, and Judge Williams availed himself "of the
learning and judgment of my brethren, the President Judge
of this court, and the President and Associate Judges of the
Court of Common Pleas." He noted that it had been ruled:
"in Zeigenfuss' Case,9 that a state insolvent, law may
exist and operate with full vigor, until the Bankrupt
Law attaches itself upon the person or property of the
debtor, by proceedings instituted in bankruptcy; and
that no case of conflict can arise until after the proceedings in bankruptcy have reached that state in which the
debtor has been judicially declared a bankrupt,"
but argued that
"sound principle would require that in all cases where
proceedings could be legally instituted, they should have
the legal capability of being perfected and closed under
the state law."
Commonwealth v. O'Hara was not followed, however,
when the same question came before the Supreme Court in
0
Scully v. Kirkpatrick."
Mr. Justice Sharswood said that
"the state remedies against fraudulent debtors are not
suspeided by the operation of the Bankrupt Act of
Congress, inasmuch as it is expressly declared in that
Act, that 'no debt created by the fraud or embezzlement
of the bankrupt or by his defalcation as a public officer,
or while acting in any fiduciary character, shall be discharged by. proceedings in bankruptcy.'"
Iiu Tobin v. Trump," Judge Thayer held that the Domestic Attachment Law of Pennsylvania, of June 13, 136,
is inoperative and void as to all cases which are within the
2

Iredell, 463.

1279 Pa. 324

(1875).

"7 Philadelphia, 123 (1869).
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provisions of the twenty-ninth section of the Bankrupt Law,

the jurisdiction of the Courts of Bankruptcy as to such
cases being exclusive.. Judge Thayer, however expressed no
opinion as to the effect of the Bankrupt Law, where the total
indebtedness did not amount to the sum of

$250,

which, by

the twenty-ninth section of the Bankrupt Law, was necessary
to give the creditors a standing in a Court of Bankruptcy.
In Shryock v. Basehore,12 President .Judge Rowe, of
Franklin County, in a long and careful opinion, decided that
the Act of Legislature of I85o, in reference to proceedings
in cases of insolvency of state banks is superseded by the
National Bankrupt Act, and a deed of assignment made in
-pursuance of such proceedings is void, because it is only part
of the appliances of a law which was suspended. This case
reached the Supreme Court and was reversed: Shyrock v.
Basehore,13 Mr. Justice Paxson said:
"A vast amount of learning .has been wasted in
this case. If the questions which were so elaborately
argued here and in the court below we-e legitimately
before us, we would certainly feel that the case was not
free from difficulty. But Basehore, the defendant, has
no standing which entitles him to raise them. He is
the debtor of the bank, and this suit was brought
against him to recover the amount of such indebtedness. He defends upon the ground that the assignment
by the bank was in contravention of the Bankrupt Law.
What is that to him? What has he to do with the distribution of the fund? That question concerns only the
creditors of the bank, and can only be raised by them."
And again:
"Whether the fund shall be distributed according
to the terms-of the Bankrupt Law, or in accordance with
our Act of 185o, under which the assignment was made,
are questions which do not concern this defendant.
"Any other coficlusion would lead to difficulty.
The time has gone by for proceedings in bankruptcy.
ii Philadelphia, 565 (1875).
' 82 Pa. 159 (1876).

218

EFFECT OF THE FEDERAL BANKRUPT ACT

There is no assignee in bankruptcy, nor can there be
under the admitted facts in the case. If the bank,
through its assignees, cannot sue for this debt, it cannot
be recovered at all."
Of course, where an adjudication in bankruptcy has taken
place, there is no question that the Federal Law, and it alone,
applies.
Thus in Barberv. Rogers,'4 B., arrested under Act of July
14, 1842, gave bond to apply to be discharged as an insol-

vent; he appeared and the hearing was continued from time
to time, and whilst pending he was adjudged a bankrupt in
United States Court. Held, that the condition of his bond
was discharged, and the sureties released. "The laws of the
United States being paramount in authority, of course, superseded those of the state."
Two or three cases which have arisen under the Pennsylvania Act of 19Ol, deserve notice.

In a recent case 5 Judge Landis held that the Act does not
apply to judgments entered before its passage.
In Estate of T. J. Dolhenty,16 Judge Weand held in a brief
opinion that the Act was entirely inoperative by reason of
the National Bankruptcy Act.
. In Hull's Estate,17 the opposite conclusion was reached by
Judge Stewart, of Franklin County. He said:
"Until, however, the paramount jurisdiction is
actually called into operation upon the particular subje't matter, the state law operates."
And again :18

"Where supremacy is yielded to the Federal Law
when it is sought to be applied there can be no conflict.
If in Pennsylvania we choose to administer insolvent
estates in our own way, and in our own courts, when
Federal authority has not actually attached the person
7 Pa. 362(0872).
'
I9 Lancaster Law Review, 14 (igo).
18 Montgomery County Rep. 21 (iOI).
'25
C. C. Rep. 353.
"P. 356.
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or property of the bankrupt, we are strictly within our
rights; and within these limits our state laws may
operate without infringing in the slightest degree upon
Federal supremacy. Allowing the Act of June 4, 1901,
to be constitutional, there are cogent reasons, aside from
the pure logic of the case, why it should be regarded as
operative. *We do not say despite the logic of the case,
but in support of the logic that would sustain the Act.
Ifthe Act be held to be suspended and inoperative, it is
difficult to see how an assigned estate for the benefit
of creditors can be safely and properly administered
here. That such assignments are valid, independent
of any statute, is beyond question. If it be an assignment of one not a trader,it is not within the purview of
the FederalLaw; if by a trader, and not assailed within
four months next after its execution, it is exempt from
an attack. How are such trusts as these to be administered if not under and according to the provisions of this
Act of June 4; 19O1 ? By the last section of the Act all
prior legislation with respect to deeds of assignment and
the administration of trusts thereby created is repealed.
This would leave us without any established system or
rules for the settlement of assigned estates. A whole
system was thought necessary to secure a wise, honest
and equal administration of such trusts; but by the repealing clause of this Act this has been swept out of
existence, unless, indeed, by a stretch of judicial authority which would approach perilously close to the
legislative function, the doctrine of suspension is to be
here again applied, and we be required to hold that the
repealing clause becomes operative only when the Federal Bankrupt Law ceases."
In Bates v. Rowley,'9 Judge Peirce said:
"In the recent case of Scully v. Kirkpatrick, the
Supreme Court decided that the Act of July 12, 1842,
to abolish imprisonment for debt, and to punish fraudulent debtors, was not superseded by the Bankrupt Act of
Congress, in cases where by reason of fraud, embezzle33 Legal Intelligencer, 2o2 (1876).
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ment, etc., the proceedings in bankruptcy would not discharge the debtor.
"It is also said that the state insolvent laws are not
entirely abrogated. They exist and operate with full
vigor until the bankrupt law20 attaches upon the person
and property of the debtor."

In an anonymous Pennsylvania case decided in* 1841,21
an assignment was held to be not void, though made after
the filing of a petition and before a decree in bankruptcy.
In State ex rel. v. Superioi Court,2 2 the Supreme Court
of Washington granted a mandamus, compelling the Superior Court to take jurisdiction of an action for the appointment of a, receiver for an insolvent corporation under state
laws, when it had not been adjudicated a bankrupt under the
law of Congress. The Court said:.
"It would seem that a corporation created under
the laws of this state would be subject to the chancery
jurisdiction of the courts, and that creditors of such
corporation should have their ordinary remedies under
existing state laws, until such corporationis adjudged
a bankrupt under the law of Congressand by the proper
tribunal. Unquestionably upon sucli adjudication the
power of the state court to further proceed ceases."
Appended to the report of this case is a very exhaustive
note 'on the relation of the Bankrupt Law to assignments.
and insolvency proceedings under state laws.
In Ketcham v. McNamara,23 the Supreme Court of Connecticut reached an exactly opposite conclusion upon the
facts from that of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in
Shryock v. Basehore,28 a and held that an action.by a trustee
in bankruptcy to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of goods
by the insolvent, since the Federal Bankrupt Act of 1898
Citing In re John Zeigenfuss,
710; S. C. 32 Iowa, 209.
"i

Clark (Pa.),

'45 L.

121.

177 (1899).

TM
5o L. R. A. 641 (igoo).
Ua 82 Pa. 159 (1876).

2

Ired. 463; Reed v. Taylor, 4 B. R.
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took effect, cannot be maintained, although the insolvent has
not been declared a bankrupt, since the title of the trustee is
not merely voidable by proceedings in bankruptcy, but is
absolutely void. Judge Baldwin said:
"Congress has seen fit to provide a different means
of impeaching such transactions, and one that leads to
different results, both as to the debtor and his creditor.
That no resort to this means has ever been had is unimportant. It was after four months from the pdssage
of the Act, at the latest, the only means that could be
pursued to set aside fraudulent conveyances, which, like
that in the case at bar, were thereafter executed. Any
different construction of the Act of Congress would
often lead to frittering away insolvent estates in legal
expenses."
The conclusions reached by that court resulted in completely absolving the fraudulent transferee from liability to
anyone.
The Pennsylvania Insolvency Act of June 4, 19o, gives
jurisdiction in involuntary insolvency proceedings, whenever an insolvent has committed any one of eight acts of
insolvency, not including an assignment for the benefit of
creditors. The National Act of July i, 1898, gives jurisdiction in bankruptcy in case of any one of five acts of bankruptcy, including assignment for the benefit of creditors.
The Act of 19oI affords remedies, which are not given by
the Bankrupt Act, as follows:
"i. Has called a meeting of his creditors for the purpose
of compounding with them, or has exhibited a statement
showing his inability to meet his liabilities, or has otherwise
acknowledged his insolvency.
"2. Has absconded or is about to abscond, with intent
to defraud any creditor, or to defeat or delay the remedy of
any creditor, or to avoid being arrested or served with legal
process, or conceals himself within or remains out of the
commonwealth, with like intent."
"5 Has been actually imprisoned for more than thirty
days, in a civil action, or, being arrested therefor, has
escaped from custody.
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"6. Has refused or neglected to comply with any order,
judgment or decree for the payment of money, and an execution therefor has been returned unsatisfied.
"7. Has suffered or permitted any attachment or sequestration to remain against any of his property, without attempting to dissolve, by rule taken for that purpose, or upon
entering security for a period of thirty days, or having taken
a rule to dissolve which has been discharged by the court, has,
not entered security within twenty days thereafter."
Under these circumstances the grave question is presented,
whether the public policy of a state, deliberately declared by
its legislature, should be defeated and frustrated, merely
because of the existence of Federal legislation, which, while
upon the same general subject matter, does not in any way
conflict with the remedies given by the State Act. In other
words, should the State Act be regarded as suspended where
the national act does not apply?
And the further query suggests itself with equal force.
are all the state laws to be regarded as suspended and as of
absolutely no vitality where the Bankrupt Act is not appliedf
For, unless proceedings in bankruptcy are commenced within
four months of the act of bankruptcy, the Federal jurisdiction cannot be invoked. Must all the state laws be suspended in toto, in -order that the Federal Act may he uniform? The alternative in case of the non-applicability or'
non-application of-the Federal Act, is between no law on the
one hand, and such state laws and remedies as the local authorities in their wisdom have seen fit to adopt on the other..
The National Bankrupt Act does not apply to a given
case unless there has been an adjudication in bankruptcy.
There can be no such adjudication unless an act of bankruptcy has been committed. The Statute carefully names
five acts of bankruptcy. These alone are legal grounds for
an adjudication. It had been held in this circuit (Judge
Dallas dissenting) that the mere fact of an execution was not
an act of bankruptcy: Duncan v. Landis.2 4 The Supreme
Court has since decided to the contrary: Wilson v. Nelson,2 5
io6 Fed.. 839 (igoi).
"Advance Sheets, January i, igo2.
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Fuller, C. J. and Shiras, Brewer and Peckham, J. J. disenting. This, of course, enlarges the scope and applicability of
the Act.
But there are still in Pennsylvania, for instance, many
cases in which the Federal Act cannot apply at all, and in
which the State Legislature, in declaring the public policy
of the commonwealth, has deemed it wise to give remedies
to creditors. This public policy in no way interferes or conflicts with the Federal law, because in none of these instances,
could the bankruptcy jurisdiction by any possibility attach.
There is a radical variance in subject matter. The two systems can work independently of each other without any clash
or disturbance.
But is this the case as to the other four acts of bankruptcy,
in respect of which the state has furnished a subordinatelyconcurrent or alternative remedy, for these four acts of bankruptcy (excluding assignments for the benefit of creditors)
are also acts of insolvency, and may be made the basis of
involuntary insolvency proceedings? We have here one of
the curious evolutions of a sovereignty within a sovereignty,
the former being a part of the latter. The state may enact
valid insolvency laws, to which full force and effect will
everywhere be given, so long as they do not impair the
obligation of contracts. The power. of the nation in this
respect is not exclusive. Can it be said to be concurrent?
Not in the same sense that Federal and State Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction of certain actions between citizens
of different states. For in the nature of the case either the
jurisdiction of the District Court sitting in bankruptcy or the
Common Pleas sitting in insolvency must be paramount. Of
course where the jurisdiction of the Federal tribunal first
attaches, and there is in fact an adjudication in bankruptcy,
this is the determination of a ptatus, a decree in remi which
binds the world, is necessarily supreme and precludes subse-•
quent remedial action in a State Court. And the same is
true, notwithstanding the jurisdiction of the State Court first
attaches; a subsequent adjudication in bankruptcy will er
propriavigore, dissolve the proceedings in the state tribunal.
Otherwise the bankruptcy law would not be "uniformthroughout the United States." No difficulty here arises;
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wherever there is a real conflict the state must yield to the
Federal jurisdiction. There still remains, however, the large
class of cases in which the Federal jurisdiction.is not invoked and Iby reason of the lapse of time cannot be. Are
the creditors to be deprived of all right of concerted action
insuch cases?
The machinery of the bankrupt court does not act sua
sponte; it must be set in motion by the bankrupt or the creditors. There must be an act of bankruptcy, e. g., an assignment for the benefit of creditors. The Federal jurisdiction
may then be invoked. But there is no obligation.upon the
creditors to invoke it. In the majority of instances the only
ground for desire to invoke the National Bankrupt Act is
in order to avoid or set aside preferences. If there have
been no preferences, and the assignee chosen or the receiver
appointed, is satisfactory to the creditors, it may be that
the creditors will prefer to have the estate administered under
the state law and under the direction of the state courts.
Congress has given to the creditors the right to choose their
representative, but Congress has seen fit to set limits to the
exercise of this right. Not only must there be an. act of
bankruptcy, but the petition must be filed within four months.
If no petition in involuntary bankruptcy is filed within four
months why should not the estate be administered by the
assignee?
It is not, of course, attempted to deny the plenary power
of Congress under the Constitution to enact a bankrupt law,
which would at once suspend in whole the operation of all
state insolvency acts. Congress is supreme in-this field and
its powers are unlimited. So far as the power is exercised
the state bankrupt law would be ipso facto suspended. Congress has not seen fit to exercise its power to this extent. It
has hedged about the right to invoke the jurisdiction of the
bankrupt court by prescribing certain limitations, beyond
-which creditors cannot go. It has further, by necessary implication from the language of the Act, given to the creditors
the election, during the period of four months, whether to
apply the Bankrupt Act. If the creditors properly invoke
the jurisdiction of the bankrupt court, it is, of course, exclusive in that particular case. But the creditors have this
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right for four months, and no longer. During this period
no one but the creditors can decide whether the Bankrupt
Act shall be applied. After the four months have elapsed
the Bankrupt Act cannot be made to apply, and no adjudication in bankruptcy can lawfully be made. Yet, if the insolvency Act is to be suspended in all its particulars, how
shall the estate of the insolvent be administered?
We have, then, two classes of cases: (a) Those to which
the Act of Congress does not apply, and (b) those to which
it is not applied. In these cases there is no conflict between
the state and Federal Law. Why must the state law be
regarded as suspended, and anarchy and chaos be preferred
to the public policy of the state?
"Expense" is one of the reasons given by the Connecticut
Court. This has no application to either class (a) or class
(b). It applies only where the Acts conflict. May it not be
suggested that even an expensive remedy is better than none?
"Uniformity" is another objection. But is there any real
lack of uniformity in merely allowing state laws to operate
where the Federal Statute does not or cannot?
"All the provisions of the state laws must stand or fall
together." But the contrary is now regarded as settled law,
so far as constitutional question: are concerned. As part of
a statute may be constitutional, and the remainder perfectly
valid, why may not part of an Act be suspended and the
balance remain in full force?
"Legal principles demand that proceedings once commenced may reach finality and fruition." This remark applies only where the state proceedings may be superseded by
bankruptcy, and has no applicability to classes (a) and (b).
Any state judgment against an insolvent may be foiled by
bankruptcy. This is a necessary incident of our dual government and Federal supremacy.
Section 7 1 b provides that "proceedings commenced under
state insolvency laws before the passage of this Act shall not
be affected by it," and impliedly prohibits subsequent insolvency proceedings. "The sole saving clause affecting
jurisdiction of State Courts provides for cases commenced
inthose courts before the passage of the Act. The plain.
implication is that proceedings commenced in the state courts
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after the passage of the Act are unauthorized:" Parmenter Mfg. Co. v. Hamilton.26 The sweeping "implication" seems scarcely to be warranted. A simple affirmative as to existing proceedings does not necessarily prohibit
all subsequent proceedings. The saving clause can be readily
interpreted as having been intended to prevent interference with the existing status by legislation, which might
be retroactively and harshly applied. Funds in the hands of
duly constituted state insolvent authorities might be rudely
wrested from them by virtue of subsequent Federal legislation almost amounting to an ex post facto law. No word
is said as to subsequent proceedings under state insolvency
laws. The effect of the passage of the Federal Act upon subsequent state insolvency proceedings must depend, not upon
this saving clause of section 71, but upon the Act as a
whole. Was it the intention of Congress to deprive the
States of a multitude and variety of remedies not given by
the Bankrupt Act? That Congress could have done so is
freely admitted. That it would have been narrow statesmanship to improvidently strike down the public policy of states
where such policy in no way interfered with the Federal
policy, and where the enforcement of the local laws in no
way conflicted with the National Act, must be conceded.
That the Congress of 1898 so intended is denied.
Ira Jewell Williams.
February, 19o2.
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Mass. 178 (1898).

